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Background. Internationally, key workers such as healthcare staff are advised to stay at home if they or household members 
experience coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)–like symptoms. This potentially isolates/quarantines many staff without SARS-
CoV-2, while not preventing transmission from staff with asymptomatic infection. We explored the impact of testing staff on absence 
durations from work and transmission risks to others.
Methods. We used a decision-analytic model for 1000 key workers to compare the baseline strategy of (S0) no RT-PCR testing of 
workers to testing workers (S1) with COVID-19–like symptoms in isolation, (S2) without COVID-19–like symptoms but in house-
hold quarantine, and (S3) all staff. We explored confirmatory re-testing scenarios of repeating all initial tests, initially positive tests, 
initially negative tests, or no re-testing. We varied all parameters, including the infection rate (0.1–20%), proportion asymptomatic 
(10–80%), sensitivity (60–95%), and specificity (90–100%).
Results. Testing all staff (S3) changes the risk of workplace transmission by −56.9 to +1.0 workers/1000 tests (with reductions 
throughout at RT-PCR sensitivity ≥65%), and absences by −0.5 to +3.6 days/test but at heightened testing needs of 989.6–1995.9 
tests/1000 workers. Testing workers in household quarantine (S2) reduces absences the most by 3.0–6.9 days/test (at 47.0–210.4 
tests/1000 workers), while increasing risk of workplace transmission by 0.02–49.5 infected workers/1000 tests (which can be minim-
ized when re-testing initially negative tests).
Conclusions. Based on optimizing absence durations or transmission risk, our modeling suggests testing staff in household 
quarantine or all staff, depending on infection levels and testing capacities.
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Since the first reports in December 2019, the newly emerged 
respiratory coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by 
the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2) has become a pandemic with widespread community 
transmission in many countries. Because of the global spread 
of a newly emerged virus, and no antivirals or vaccines being 
available, the World Health Organization and many public 
health agencies internationally advise individuals to stay at 
home if either they or a household member experiences symp-
toms of COVID-19, to mitigate the community spread of the 
pandemic SARS-CoV-2 virus [1–4].
As COVID-19 symptoms are nonspecific, not all individuals 
staying at home will be infected, and testing workers for SARS-
CoV-2 would enable uninfected individuals to remain available 
for work [5–7]. This is particularly important for workers whose 
occupational roles are critical to the functioning of society and 
the COVID-19 response (so-called “key workers”), including 
in health and social care, transport, education, public safety, 
government, utilities, and food production and delivery [8, 9]. 
Additionally, asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 likely contributes to 
transmission [10], which could be reduced by testing. Capacity 
for (extensive) testing may be limited [11, 12], however, and 
is also required by patients. Targeted testing and optimizing 
testing strategies are thus important internationally.
For key workers, the crucial question faced is whether to con-
centrate on testing staff for infection with SARS-CoV-2 who 
present as cases with COVID-19–like symptoms, staff who are 
asymptomatic but quarantining at home, or all staff regardless of 
symptom status or quarantine. We used a decision-analytic model 
to explore the impact of different testing strategies for SARS-
CoV-2 infection by swabbing and reverse transcriptase–poly-
merase chain reaction (RT-PCR) on (1) the duration key workers 
such as healthcare staff spend in household isolation, (2) the 
numbers of staff at work who may spread SARS-CoV-2, (3) the 
testing accuracy (ie, the proportion of true positive and true nega-
tive results among all tests), and (4) the required numbers of tests.
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METHODS
Epidemiological Data Informing the Decision-Analytic Model
We varied the proportion of key workers and their house-
holds with infectious and detectable SARS-CoV-2 infection at 
any given time between 0.1% and 20% (base value: 2% [13]), 
reflecting different levels of mitigation and including the ex-
pected prevalence of 5.8% when an assumed 80% of the workers 
and household members become infected over the course of a 
3-month epidemic, with a mean duration of infectiousness of 
6.5 days [14] (0.80 × 6.5 days/90 days = 0.058). We considered 
between 10% and 80% of SARS-CoV-2 infections to be asymp-
tomatic or subclinical (base value: 18%) [10], between 10% and 
80% of cases to involve COVID-19–like symptoms of a high 
fever (base value: 47%) [11], and between 0% and 20% of infec-
tions to be too severe for isolation at home and to require hos-
pitalization (base value: 4.4%) [14]. Another 10% of workers are 
assumed to experience COVID-19–like symptoms from other 
respiratory illnesses [6], of whom 2% are assumed to become 
hospitalized [15]. Furthermore, key workers without symptoms 
but with symptomatic household contacts need to self-isolate 
(49% of key workers in the United Kingdom live with children 
and a partner [9]; the rates of illness in household members 
and key workers were assumed to be the same). RT-PCR test 
sensitivity (proportion of infected individuals testing positive) 
was varied between 60% and 95% (with an assumed base value 
of 75%), and specificity (proportion of uninfected individuals 
testing negative) was varied between 90% and 100% (base value: 
90%) [16, 17]. All input parameters of the model were varied in 
sensitivity analyses.
Strategies of Testing for SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Key Workers
Our static decision-analytic model followed 1000 key workers 
to compare the baseline strategy of no testing and self-isolating 
based on COVID-19–like symptoms alone (S0) with 3 strategies 
of testing: (S1) key workers with COVID-19–like symptoms in 
isolation, (S2) key workers without COVID-19–like symptoms 
but in household quarantine due to exposure to symptomatic 
household contacts, and (S3) one-off testing all key workers, in-
cluding those without COVID-19–like symptoms or household 
exposure.
In addition, we explored 5 confirmatory re-testing scenarios 
for each strategy: repeating (A) all initial tests, (B) initially pos-
itive tests [18], (C) initially negative tests, (D) no re-testing [5, 
18, 19], or (E) no re-testing but additional isolation for 2 weeks 
for laboratory-confirmed cases without severe symptoms [1] 
(Table 1, Figure 1).
For strategy S2, we also explored in a separate scenario anal-
ysis testing the symptomatic household contact of the key 
worker in household quarantine (as the index case who re-
quired the household to quarantine).
Assumed Absence Durations Informing the Model
International guidance recommends key workers with 
COVID-19–like symptoms to self-isolate for 7  days, and 
workers in household quarantine for 14  days [1, 3]. We as-
sumed symptomatic workers who tested negative to self-isolate 
for 3 days on account of their presumed non–COVID-19 acute 
respiratory illness [20]. Symptomatic workers in symptomatic 
households are assumed to stay an additional 2 days at home 
(for an equal chance of who became symptomatic first [21, 
22]). Key workers in household quarantine who tested nega-
tive are assumed to self-isolate for 7 days until the infectivity 
of the case at home is assumed to have ended [14]. We ex-
plored different values for the durations in isolation and quar-
antine in sensitivity analyses (for more details, see Figure  1 
and Supplementary Table 1).
Table 1. Strategies of Testing Key Workers for Infection With SARS-CoV-2 to Enable Them to Return to Work as Soon as Possible While Minimizing the 
Risk of Transmission




















Not Positives No Re-tests
No Re-tests 
(+14 Days for 
Mild, Positive 
Cases)
0 No No No n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1 Yes No No 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
2 No Yes No 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E
3 Yes Yes Yes 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
Strategy 0 assumes no testing is performed. In line with guidance [5, 11], strategy 1 explored testing key workers with COVID-19–like symptoms, including a new continuous cough and/or 
high fever [3]. Strategy 2 explored testing key workers without symptoms but household exposure to symptomatic contacts in household quarantine (note: we explored testing the symp-
tomatic household contact of the key worker as the index case who required the household to quarantine in scenario analysis; see Supplementary Figure 2). Strategy 3 explored testing 
all key workers, including one-off testing of key workers without symptoms or household exposure and not in quarantine/isolation, to identify infections and then isolate infected workers. 
The letters correspond to the 5 confirmatory testing scenarios (A–E), including the WHO recommendation for mild laboratory-confirmed cases to isolate for an additional 2 weeks where 
confirmatory testing is not possible [1]. Note: “Isolation” refers to symptomatic cases, while “quarantine” refers to individuals who are not currently infectious and show no symptoms (yet) 
but may have been exposed to symptomatic household contacts and so might be infected and might become infectious. Where we need an umbrella term to refer to some people who are 
sick and others who are not we use the term isolation. 
Abbreviations: COVID-19, coronavirus diseasea 2019; n/a, not applicable; SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; WHO, World Health Organization.
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RESULTS
With the baseline strategy of no testing and self-isolating based on 
COVID-19–like symptoms alone (S0), we expect 987–2267 days 
lost in isolation and 0.562–104.1 infected workers with the po-
tential to spread per 1000 key workers. Testing strategies S1 and 
S2 are expected to reduce the total number of days of the absence 
durations, while S3 may increase it (Table  2). Conversely, strat-
egies S1 and S2 may increase the total number of infected workers 
remaining at work, while S3 may reduce it (Table  2). The total 
number of tests for the 1000 key workers varies per testing strategy 
and re-testing scenario as is shown in Table 2.
Efficiency of Testing Strategies as Compared With No Testing (S0)
In order to optimize the testing strategies in reducing staff ab-
sences and workplace transmission risk it is important to con-
sider the efficiency of the number of tests performed. Figures 2 
and 3 present the main findings for the 3 different testing strat-
egies (S1–S3) in terms of changes in absence duration and the 
transmission risk per test against the baseline of no testing (S0). 
Note that negative values of change thus represent desirable re-
ductions (in transmission risk or days in isolation; indicated in 
white-shaded areas). Also, the impact of the variation in key 
epidemiological parameters (the proportion of infected workers 
Figure 1. Model decision tree of the explored testing strategies in key workers for infection with SARS-CoV-2, and the assumed absence durations (in days). For a technical 
description of the underlying model accounting for test sensitivity and specificity see Supplementary Figure 1. Abbreviations: COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019; SARS-
CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
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Table 2. Model Results for SARS-CoV-2 Testing in 1000 Key Workers, Including the Ranges of the Uncertainty of Infected Workers, Proportion 
Asymptomatic, Specificity, and Sensitivity
Strategy










Efficiency Compared With No Testing, S0
Testing Accuracy
Change of Days in 
Isolation (per Test)
Change of Workers 
Spreading (per 1000 
Tests)
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
S0 0.0 0.0 987 2267 0.562 104.1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
S1A 92.8 219.6 804 2049 0.653 122.4 −1.97 −1.00 0.983 83.048 0.831 0.988
S1B 51.3 168.2 802 1993 0.722 136.0 −3.60 −1.63 3.113 189.750 0.709 0.996
S1C 87.6 161.2 823 2118 0.585 108.7 −1.87 −0.93 0.195 28.283 0.884 0.991
S1D 46.4 109.8 821 2062 0.653 122.4 −3.58 −1.87 1.966 166.096 0.800 0.965
S1E 46.4 109.8 821 2062 0.653 122.4 −3.58 −1.87 1.966 166.096 0.800 0.965
S2A 93.9 210.4 661 1612 0.569 107.7 −3.47 −3.12 0.078 16.801 0.958 0.997
S2B 51.7 124.9 658 1587 0.575 110.3 −6.89 −5.44 0.247 49.525 0.940 0.999
S2C 89.2 190.7 694 1693 0.564 105.0 −3.48 −3.01 0.017 4.635 0.890 0.999
S2D 47.0 105.2 691 1669 0.569 107.7 −6.93 −5.69 0.155 33.603 0.880 0.997
S2E 47.0 105.2 754 1945 0.569 107.7 −6.80 −3.07 0.155 33.603 0.880 0.997
S3A 1979.2 1995.9 611 2580 0.239 47.8 −0.22 0.16 −28.455 −0.162 0.944 0.995
S3B 1011.5 1212.8 491 2142 0.418 83.7 −0.47 −0.10 −16.876 0.971 0.915 0.999
S3C 1756.0 1980.0 712 3934 0.048 11.9 −0.20 0.95 −52.488 −0.265 0.890 0.999
S3D 989.6 998.0 676 3495 0.239 47.8 −0.44 1.24 −56.909 −0.324 0.871 0.995
S3E 989.6 998.0 801 5803 0.239 47.8 −0.31 3.57 −56.909 −0.324 0.871 0.995
Highlighting per testing strategy in bold: Lowest number of tests, days in isolation, and workers spreading (per 1000 tests); highest reduction/lowest increase of days in isolation, highest 
reduction/lowest increase of workers spreading (per 1000 tests), highest accuracy. 
Abbreviations: Max, maximum; Min, minimum; n/a, not applicable; SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
Figure 2. Change in the days in self-isolation and the transmission risk per test (in rows), shown per strategy (in columns) for different proportions of SARS-CoV-2–infected 
workers and asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection. Note that negative values of changes represent desirable reductions. Abbreviations: COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019; 
SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
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and asymptomatic in Figure 2 and the RT-PCR specificity and 
sensitivity in Figure 3) is illustrated with the different sizes and 
fading of the shapes, with smaller shapes that are fading out 
representing increasing parameter values. All other parameters 
were kept at their base value, and their impact on results are 
presented in the Supplementary Material and discussed below 
(note that the variation of results for all other disease param-
eters is captured within the range of these 4 key parameters).
Testing workers with COVID-19–like symptoms (S1) may 
reduce absences by 0.9–3.6 days per test for those uninfected 
with SARS-CoV-2 or with false-negative results; the latter may 
increase transmission risk to others when back at work by 0.2–
189.8 infected workers per 1000 tests (depending on the rate of 
infection) (Figure 2). Re-testing negatives (S1C) increases the 
transmission risk the least (0.2–28.3 workers per 1000 tests) 
(Figure 2), while still reducing absence durations (0.9–1.9 days). 
The number of tests is the second highest (87.6–161.2 tests per 
1000 workers) at an accuracy of 88.4–99.1% (Table 2).
Similarly, testing workers in household quarantine (S2) may 
reduce absences by 3.0–6.9 days per test but increase transmis-
sion risk to others by 0.02–49.5 workers per 1000 tests (Figure 2). 
Re-testing negatives (S2C) increases the transmission risk the 
least (0.02–4.6 workers per 1000 tests), while reducing absence 
durations (3.0–3.5 days per test), at 89.2–190.7 tests per 1000 
workers and an accuracy of 89.0–99.9% (Table 2).
Testing all key workers (S3) may change absence durations 
between −0.5 and +3.6  days per test, largely due to finding 
asymptomatic infections and false-positive results. It changes 
the transmission risk between −56.9 and +0.97 workers per 
1000 tests (Figure 2), with an increased risk of workplace trans-
mission only at low sensitivity of 60% and when re-testing 
positives (S3B). The accuracy (87.1–99.9%) and testing needs 
(989.6–1995.9 tests per 1000 workers) are high.
Sensitivity Analyses
The reductions in absence were most sensitive to the test speci-
ficity (affecting false-positives) (Figure 3, the vertical dispersion 
of values), while transmission risk was most sensitive to the rate 
of infection (affecting numbers of infections) (Figure  2). The 
accuracy was most dependent on the positive-predictive value 
of testing strategies (Supplementary Table 2, Supplementary 
Figures 3 and 4). If the proportion of infections that are asymp-
tomatic is higher and there are fewer symptomatic cases, then 
fewer individuals are expected to isolate at home even in the 
Figure 3. Change in the days in self-isolation and the transmission risk per test (in rows), shown per strategy (in columns) for different proportions of RT-PCR specificity 
and sensitivity. Note that negative values of changes represent desirable reductions. Abbreviations: COVID-19, coronavirus disease 2019; RT-PCR, reverse transcriptase–
polymerase chain reaction.
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baseline scenario without testing, which, in turn, changes the 
number of staff who are being tested by the different testing 
strategies. This difference between testing strategies and the 
baseline of no-testing may lead to nonproportional changes in 
the efficiency of testing, and hence small variation in results 
even when testing all staff (Figure 2).
The sensitivity of the other parameters showed that none of 
the rates of illness changed results beyond the impact of the 4 
key epidemiological parameters; more extreme numbers of days 
spent in isolation may be less plausible, but they would lead to 
largely different absence durations (Supplementary Figures 
5–8). Our separate scenario analysis of testing the symptomatic 
index case in households in quarantine increases the number of 
tests, which decreases the magnitude of the outcomes but not 
their direction (Supplementary Figure 2).
DISCUSSION
Self-isolation depletes the supply of key workers essential during 
the COVID-19 pandemic and whose work is valued very highly 
[23, 24]. For example, with public services in healthcare under 
pressure from COVID-19 internationally, maximizing the 
availability of staff is critical. Our model results indicate that, 
as compared with no testing (S0), testing all workers (S3) may 
reduce the risk of workplace transmission the most by finding 
asymptomatic infections (particularly at an RT-PCR sensi-
tivity of ≥65%), but with increased staff absences and greatly 
increased testing capacity needs. In contrast, testing workers 
in quarantine (S2) reduces absence durations the most by 
identifying those who are not SARS-CoV-2 infected, allowing 
some of these staff to return to work earlier than without testing 
but at an increased risk of workplace transmission. This risk can 
be mitigated but not eliminated through re-testing initially neg-
ative samples for staff in quarantine (S2C).
The optimal testing strategy will be context dependent and 
setting specific, and also depends on the risk of workplace ex-
posure, the levels of infection that will differ by occupation and 
during the course of the epidemic, the availability of testing ca-
pacity and resources, and the relative weight given to reducing 
staff absences (which may be valued higher during staff short-
ages) and reducing transmission risk to others (which may be 
valued higher for frontline healthcare staff working with vul-
nerable individuals in hospitals and care homes). It will also 
differ for frontline workers in frequent contact with vulnerable 
individuals versus those in important supporting roles in the 
back office, which carry a lower risk of exposure. For instance, 
strategy S3 might be targeted at workers who contact vulnerable 
individuals such as immunocompromised patients or nursing-
home residents. Weekly testing of asymptomatic workers could 
be considered for those who have never been tested before 
(where the chance of being positive equals the prevalence) or 
for workers who tested negative a week ago (where the chance 
of being positive equals the risk of being infected in the last 
7 days).
Testing capacity is limited and is also required by patients. 
For instance, at 1 testing episode with a re-test per key worker 
per 3 months, testing the estimated 670 000 frontline healthcare 
workers in the United Kingdom [25] requires approximately 
15 000 tests per day. With approximately 11.8 million health-
care workers in the European Union and the UK [26], capacity 
for more than 250 000 tests per day would be needed just to test 
healthcare staff (possibly increased 10-fold to capture all key 
workers essential to the pandemic response, as seen by the esti-
mated 7.1 million key workers in total in the United Kingdom 
[9]). Similarly, testing the 3.8 million registered nurses and 
physicians in the United States alone requires capacity for more 
than 80 000 tests per day [27]. Given the possible shortages of 
laboratory supplies for extensive testing and contact tracing 
[11, 12], targeted testing thus remains important internation-
ally. Testing healthcare workers will also remain a priority be-
cause, despite using personal protective equipment, (1) most 
frontline healthcare workers have a high rate of exposure to 
infection, due to patients with COVID-19 seeking care and 
due to staff being in close proximity to those patients and per-
forming aerosol-generating procedures such as tracheal intu-
bation/extubation [28, 29], and (2) infected workers are at risk 
of transmission to vulnerable patients (and other healthcare 
workers) not infected with SARS-CoV-2. However, it is impor-
tant to be aware of the wide range of alternative uses for testing 
in the community with different resource implications—for ex-
ample, screening symptomatic cases, screening their contacts, 
or more intensive screening in semi-enclosed settings such as 
care homes or prisons, etc. Quantifying these alternative uses 
of testing resources will be important but is outside the scope 
of this paper.
Strengths and Limitations
This rapid analysis was based on the known epidemiology of 
SARS-CoV-2 infection and international recommendations 
for self-isolation [1–4]. We considered a wide range of values 
for all input parameters and expressed the variation in results 
for 1000 key workers to increase generalizability of findings 
and to provide insights for different audiences, reflecting the 
uncertainty in various occupations, activities, and settings. 
Furthermore, test sensitivity using swabbing and RT-PCR has 
been reported to be as low as 71% in hospitalized patients [17]. 
However, SARS-CoV-2 causes both upper respiratory tract in-
fection (URTI) and lower respiratory tract infection (LRTI); 
the latter causes pneumonia while the former will be more im-
portant for transmission and will be detected more reliably by 
swabbing. Therefore, swab sensitivity in hospitalized patients 
may be lower than in community cases of illness because hos-
pitalized patients will be more likely to have pneumonia caused 
by LRTI, and some of them might have very little URTI. Also, 
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hospitalization typically occurs after several days of illness, 
when viral shedding is declining (unless in the case of severe 
COVID-19) [30]. Hence, swabbing may be more sensitive for 
detection of community cases who are a transmission risk (ie, 
those with URTI) than for all cases of COVID-19. It is possible 
that asymptomatic infection is associated with lower viral shed-
ding, which may reduce the sensitivity of testing but which may 
also reduce infectivity; further research is required.
Our analysis assumes compliance with testing and with iso-
lation/quarantine rules. Noncompliance would reduce the 
beneficial effects of testing. However, noncompliance with 
testing of symptomatic cases would require hiding of symp-
toms from colleagues; noncompliance with screening of 
asymptomatic individuals would be even harder if all staff are 
required to be tested; and noncompliance with staying at home 
for the required isolation/quarantine period by those who 
test positive would be difficult if staff are not allowed to work. 
Noncompliance with household quarantine (ie, staying at home 
due to a household member’s illness) may be easier to achieve 
because it simply requires nondisclosure, but it may be less 
likely to occur with healthcare workers who are motivated to 
care for patients. Furthermore, people evading household quar-
antine and attending work would have done so in the absence 
of a testing strategy, and infection could be found by asympto-
matic screening. Those required to stay at home may choose to 
leave their home for shopping, leisure, or socializing, and thus 
transmit infection in the community, but this is not the focus of 
our analysis.
We did not model transmission dynamics to calculate num-
bers of transmission events because this is highly context de-
pendent and requires knowledge of transmission probabilities 
per contact (by type of contact), rates of contact (by type of 
contact), mixing patterns (ie, characteristics of individuals with 
whom contact is made), etc. Hence, we report on the change 
in transmission risk from infected workers returning to work, 
which we acknowledge may underestimate transmission re-
ductions from finding asymptomatic infection and transmis-
sion increases from releasing false-negatives from isolation 
or household quarantine. Findings for strategy S3 could thus 
lead to shorter absence durations but at increased transmission 
risks, and additional labor shortages as a result from secondary 
infections of infected workers returning to work. Other benefits 
of testing, such as reduced anxiety [7, 13] and improved surveil-
lance, were not explicitly included in our analysis. Additional 
occupational measures will also be needed to protect, maintain, 
and restore the physical and mental health of key workers [31, 
32].
Conclusions
Our model results suggest the largest reduction of days in isola-
tion at minimally increased transmission risk when testing key 
workers in household quarantine for SARS-CoV-2 infection as 
compared with no testing and self-isolating based on COVID-
19–like symptoms alone, or if capacity allowed, testing all staff 
if preventing workplace transmission is paramount.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary materials are available at Clinical Infectious Diseases online. 
Consisting of data provided by the authors to benefit the reader, the posted 
materials are not copyedited and are the sole responsibility of the authors, so 
questions or comments should be addressed to the corresponding author.
Notes
Author contributions. F. G. S. and M. R. conceived the study. F. G. S. per-
formed the analysis and wrote the first draft of the manuscript with feed-
back from all other authors. The corresponding author had full access to all 
study data and had final responsibility for the decision to submit for pub-
lication. All authors contributed to the interpretation of the data and find-
ings, contributed to the manuscript, and approved the work for publication.
Disclaimer. The study sponsors had no role in the study design, data 
collection, data analysis, data interpretation, report writing, or decision to 
submit for publication. The views expressed are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the UK Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), 
the Department for International Development (DFID), the European 
Union (EU), the UK Medical Research Council (MRC), the National 
Health Service (NHS), the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR), 
or Public Health England (PHE). 
Financial support. This work was supported by Public Health England 
(PHE), which is an executive agency of the Department of Health 
and Social Care (DHSC). F.  G. S., P.  J. W., and M.  J.  were supported by 
the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Protection 
Research Unit (HPRU) in Modelling and Health Economics, a partner-
ship between PHE, Imperial College London, and the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) (grant number NIHR200908). 
P.  J. W.  was supported by the MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease 
Analysis (grant number MR/R015600/1); this award is jointly funded by 
the UK Medical Research Council (MRC) and the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) under the MRC/DFID Concordat 
agreement and is also part of the EDCTP2 programme supported by the 
European Union (EU). P.  J. W.  was supported by the NIHR HPRU in 
Modelling Methodology at Imperial College London in partnership with 
PHE (HPRU-2012–10080). M.  J.  was supported by the NIHR HPRU in 
Immunisation at LSHTM in partnership with PHE (grant number HPRU-
2012–10096) and the European Commission (EC) Horizon 2020 Research 
and Innovation Programme—project EpiPose (grant number 101003688).
Potential conflicts of interest. The authors: No reported conflicts of 
interest. All authors have submitted the ICMJE Form for Disclosure of 
Potential Conflicts of Interest.
References
1. World Health Organization. Home care for patients with COVID-19 presenting 
with mild symptoms and management of their contacts: interim guidance, 
17 March 2020. 2020. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/
home-care-for-patients-with-suspected-novel-coronavirus-(ncov)-infection-
presenting-with-mild-symptoms-and-management-of-contacts. Accessed 19 
June 2020.
2. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Technical report: contact 
tracing: public health management of persons, including healthcare workers, 
having had contact with COVID-19 cases in the European Union—second up-
date. 8 April 2020. Available at: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
documents/Contact-tracing-Public-health-management-persons-including-
healthcare-workers-having-had-contact-with-COVID-19-cases-in-the-
European-Union%E2%80%93second-update_0.pdf. Accessed 19 June 2020.
3. Public Health England. Stay at home: guidance for households with possible or 
confirmed coronavirus (COVID-19) infection. Updated 18 June 2020. Available 
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/covid-19-stay-at-home-
guidance/stay-at-home-guidance-for-households-with-possible-coronavirus-
covid-19-infection. Accessed 19 June 2020.
8 • cid 2020:XX (XX XXXX) • Sandmann et al
4. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Social distancing, quarantine, and 
isolation—keep your distance to slow the spread. 2020. Available at: https://www.
cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html. 
Accessed 10 April 2020.
5. World Health Organization. Laboratory testing strategy recommendations for 
COVID-19: interim guidance, 22 March 2020. Available at: https://www.who.int/
publications/i/item/laboratory-testing-strategy-recommendations-for-covid-19-
interim-guidance. Accessed 19 June 2020.
6. Iacobucci G. Covid-19: “illogical” lack of testing is causing healthy staff to self-
isolate, BMA chief warns. BMJ 2020; 368:m1277.
7. Hunter E, Price DA, Murphy E, et al. First experience of COVID-19 screening of 
health-care workers in England. Lancet 2020; 395:e77–8.
8. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Implementing safety practices for 
critical infrastructure workers who may have had exposure to a person with 
suspected or confirmed COVID-19. 2020. Available at: https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/critical-workers/implementing-safety-
practices.html. Accessed 19 June 2020.
9. Institute for Fiscal Studies. Key workers: key facts and questions. 2020. Available 
at: https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14763. Accessed 19 June 2020.
10. Mizumoto  K, Kagaya  K, Zarebski  A, Chowell  G. Estimating the asymptomatic 
proportion of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases on board the diamond 
princess cruise ship, Yokohama, Japan, 2020. Euro Surveill 2020; 25:2000180.
11. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Rapid risk assessment: 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic: increased transmission in 
the EU/EEA and the UK—seventh update: 25 March 2020. Stockholm, Sweden: 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020.
12. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Rapid risk assessment: corona-
virus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the EU/EEA and the UK—tenth update: 11 June 2020. 
Stockholm, Sweden: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020.
13. Keeley AJ, Evans C, Colton H, et al. Roll-out of SARS-CoV-2 testing for healthcare 
workers at a large NHS Foundation Trust in the United Kingdom, March 2020. 
Euro Surveill. 2020; 25:2000433.
14. Ferguson  NM, Laydon  D, Nedjati-Gilani  G, et  al. Report 9: impact of non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID19 mortality and health-
care demand. London: Imperial College, 2020.
15. Cromer D, van Hoek AJ, Jit M, Edmunds WJ, Fleming D, Miller E. The burden of 
influenza in England by age and clinical risk group: a statistical analysis to inform 
vaccine policy. J Infect 2014; 68:363–71.
16. Corman  VM, Landt  O, Kaiser  M, et  al. Detection of 2019 novel coronavirus 
(2019-nCoV) by real-time RT-PCR. Euro Surveill 2020; 25:2000045.
17. Fang Y, Zhang H, Xie J, et al. Sensitivity of chest CT for COVID-19: comparison 
to RT-PCR. Radiology 2020; 296:E115–17. doi:10.1148/radiol.2020200432.
18. Public Health England. Guidance COVID-19: laboratory investi-
gations and sample requirements for diagnosis. Updated 28 March 
2020. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
wuhan-novel-coronavirus-guidance-for-clinical-diagnostic-laboratories/
laboratory-investigations-and-sample-requirements-for-diagnosing-and-
monitoring-wn-cov-infection. Accessed 10 April 2020.
19. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Laboratory support for 
COVID-19 in the EU/EEA. 2020. Available at: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/
novel-coronavirus/laboratory-support. Accessed 31 March 2020.
20. Cori A, Valleron AJ, Carrat F, Scalia Tomba G, Thomas G, Boëlle PY. Estimating 
influenza latency and infectious period durations using viral excretion data. 
Epidemics 2012; 4:132–8.
21. Zhanwei D, Xu X, Wu Y, et al. Serial interval of COVID-19 among publicly re-
ported confirmed cases. Emerg Infect Dis J 2020; 26:1341–3. doi:10.3201/
eid2606.200357. 
22. Cowling BJ, Fang VJ, Riley S, Malik Peiris JS, Leung GM. Estimation of the serial 
interval of influenza. Epidemiology 2009; 20:344–7.
23. Sandmann FG, Robotham JV, Deeny SR, Edmunds WJ, Jit M. Estimating the op-
portunity costs of bed-days. Health Econ 2018; 27:592–605.
24. Mark K, Steel K, Stevenson  J, et  al. Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) commu-
nity testing team in Scotland: a 14-day review, 6 to 20 February 2020. 2020; 
25:2000217. doi:10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2020.25.12.2000217.
25. NHS Digital. NHS workforce statistics, December 2019: England and organ-
isation. 2019. Available at: https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publi-
cations/statistical/nhs-workforce-statistics/december-2019. Accessed 19 June 
2020.
26. European Statistical Office (Eurostat). Healthcare personnel statistics—nursing 
and caring professionals. 2019. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php/Healthcare_personnel_statistics_-_nursing_and_
caring_professionals. Accessed 19 June 2020.
27. US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Healthcare occupations. 2020. Available at: https://
www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/home.htm. Accessed 19 June 2020.
28. Tran K, Cimon K, Severn M, Pessoa-Silva CL, Conly J. Aerosol generating pro-
cedures and risk of transmission of acute respiratory infections to healthcare 
workers: a systematic review. PLoS One 2012; 7:e35797.
29. Weissman DN, de Perio MA, Radonovich LJ Jr. COVID-19 and risks posed 
to personnel during endotracheal intubation. JAMA 2020; 323: 2027–8.
30. Liu Y, Yan LM, Wan L, et al. Viral dynamics in mild and severe cases of COVID-
19. Lancet Infect Dis 2020; 20:656–7. doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30232-2
31. World Health Organization (WHO). Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) out-
break: Rights, roles and responsibilities of health workers, including key con-
siderations for occupational safety and health. 2020. Available at: https://www.
who.int/publications/i/item/coronavirus-disease-(covid-19)-outbreak-rights-
roles-and-responsibilities-of-health-workers-including-key-considerations-for-
occupational-safety-and-health. Accessed 19 June 2020.
32. Greenberg  N, Docherty  M, Gnanapragasam  S, Wessely  S. Managing mental 
health challenges faced by healthcare workers during covid-19 pandemic. BMJ 
2020; 368:m1211.
